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Known as the ''Pres no
Anti-Noise
' it
makes unlawful the emi:-;sion or transmission of ''any loud
and raucous noise upon or
any
or from any aircraft
soever.'' A violation of
ordinance
fine not to exceed
detention in
a
not in
As defined
raueous noise''
any
kind not reasonrequired in the
thereof under the circumstances
and shall inclmle bnt not be limited to
motor
aud the buzzing by
''
'l'he sound of the
plosive except
or with
body having control of the
"(3) The human yo icc or any record or reeording thereof
when amplified by auy device whether electrical or mechanical
or otherwise to such an extent as to cause it to carry on to
private property or to be heard
others
the public
highways or public
" ( 4) Any sound not included in the foregoing which is
power as to tend to
of such volnme, intensity, or
interfere with t!Je peace and
of persons upon private
property or other users of the public highways and thoroughfares.''
Shortly after its
several persons were arrested
upon eharges of
ordinance. All of them were
members or
of the California State Federation
of Labor or its affiliate, the National Farm r,abor Union,
~:md when arrested they were
'' along certain
public highways or roads
to farms. By means of
automobile horm; and
mounted on their cars,
they were attempting to attract the attention of farm workers
and to induce them to quit work and engage in a strike to
enforce union demands for wages.
C. J. Haggerty, the
of the California State I'lederation of I,abor a11d a nwmber of its affiliated union, ~mecl
to enjoin ihe enforcement of the on!i1Jance. 'l'be aetion was
lJron~~ht 011 belwJf of him;.;elf a11d th(: wemb(•rs of the two
labor
tlwse JH:rsons
arrested for violating the ordinance.
The trial comt found that, unless
the law
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crimmembers of tbe unions to
to another finding, the
federation and the farm labor union
numerous members,
each of them has an interest in the subject
nn1praet1~~ao1e to
all
""y,,y,_.,.Tv was authorized to ""'"""""'!·<>
to test the constitutionality
conclusions that
plaintiff,
nl'A<U>t>11Tlroft under said Ordinance
and use
on the public highways
and that the ordinance
effectively pre.Lll<>vuu as it purports to prohibit the use
upon the public highways and thoroughfares
" it was concluded, the ordinance "is unconstitutional upon its face as an
the constitutional
...,,.au""'"' of the
of free
'' More specifically, the
defining "loud
court held
and raucous noise''
''the human voice or any
record or
when
by any device
electrical or
or otherwise to such an
extent as to cause it to carry on to
heard
others
the
" and concluded that
definition "is so inseparable
from the other
of said Ordinance that the entire
Ordinance must be found to be unconstitutional.''
The county and the county officials have appealed from
and from an order
to vacate the judgfor reversal
contend that the ordinance is constitutional on
even if it is unconstitutional, they argue,
has not shown a proper
for equitable relief
its enforcement.
At the trial it was
that the union members
who were arrested were
on a charge of violating
uu•.a.u,oc 415. The
did not include the particular
of the
applicable to the conduct for
which the arrests were made. Attempts were made by Hagto show that
ordinance is unconstitutional in its
particular application to the activities carried on at the
time of the arrests. He sought to establish the existence of

free
proinclude
of the

v. N cw
92 L.Ed.
]
, an ordinance
of ''any radio device,
mechanical
loud
or any device of any kind
the sound thercfeom is cast
upon the streets
. . . where . . . maintained for advertising purposes or for the purpose of
the attention
of the
or which is so
and operated
therefrom
be heard to the annoyance or inconvenience of travelers .. or of persons in
neighboring
from the statutory ban
radio loud -speakers, of
was ''
ublic '-'"'''"~uauu
items of news
concern and athletic
activities . . . under
obtained from the Chief of
Police.''
up a loud-speaker in
Saia, one
a public
programs
without
the chief of police.
He was convicted in the state court of
the ordinance.
In the
of
of the
the
''is unconstitutional on its face, for it
restraint on the right of free speech
in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by
Amendment
State action. To use a
a
from the
'fhere are no standards prescribed for the
exercise of his discretion. 'rhe statute is not
to regulate the hours or
of use of
the volume of sound
to which
The ordinance therefore has all the vices of the
ones which we struck down in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 LEd. 1213, 128 .A.L.R. 1352];

It
same dethe uncontrolled
athwart the
channels
communication as an obstruction which can be
after criminal trial and
removed
A
effective
instruThe sound truck has become
It is the way
. The present ordinance would be a
weapon if it were allo'wed to
a hold ou our
public life. Noise can be
regulating decibels.
of
'fhe hours and
discussion can be controlled.
because
But to allow the
J heir use can be abused is like
radio receivers because
they too make a noise. The police need not be given the
po>ver to
a man the use of his radio in order to protect
a neighbor
'l'he same is true here.
''Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled
by
drawn statutes. \\Then a
allows an official
to ban them in his uncontrolled
it sanctions a
device for
of free communication of ideas. In
this case a permit is denied because some persons were said
to have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit
may be denied because some people find the ideas annoying.
Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound.
'l'he power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance
reveals its vice." (Pp. 360,
562
U.S.].)
JVIr. Justice Frankfurter dissented with Justices Heed and
Burton upon the ground that the lim]tations of the ordinance
"upon the exercise of appellant's rights of utterance did not
.. exceed the acconnnodation between the conflicting interests which the State was here entitled to make in view of
time and place and circumstances." (P. 566
U. S.] .)
Mr. Justice Jackson stated in dissent that no issue of free
speech was involved. As he viewed the problem, it was one
of regulation of the use of sound apparatus which, in his
44 C.2d-3
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Kovacs v.
S.Ct.
93 L.Ed. 513,
10 A.L.R.2d 608], concerned an ordinance under which one
eould not lawfully operate ''for any purpose
on
upon the public streets, alleys or thoroughfares'' of the
''any device known as a sound
loud-speaker or
sound amplifier, . . . or any instrument of any kind or character which emits therefrom loud and raucous noises and is
attached to and upon any vehicle . . . . '' Kovacs 1vas arrested
when he operated a sound truck on a public street. The
judgment of conviction was affirmed.
A determination of the precise basis for the decision is
made difficult by the number of opinions filrd. Mr. Justice
Reed, joined by Mr. Justice Burton and Chief Justice Vinson,
distinguished the Saia case upon the ground that the ordinance there concerned allowed a previous restraint within
the uncontrolled discretion of the chief of police. "This
ordinance," they said, "is not of that character. It contains
nothing comparable to the above-quoted . . . [section] of
the ordinance in the Saia case. It is an exercise of the
authority granted to the city by New Jersey 'to prevent
disturbing noises,' . . . nuisances well within the municipality's power to control. The police power of a state extends
beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty,
within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being
and tranquility of a community. A state or city may prohibit
acts or things reasonably thought to bring evil or harm to
its people." (Pp. 82-83 [336 U.S.].)
The opinion accepted the construction of the statute given
by the New Jersey court as prohibiting vehicles with sound
amplifiers emitting loud and raucous noises, and stated the
decisive question as being "whether or not there is a real
abridgment of tl1e rights of free speech." It was said that
''even the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not
absolute. The Saia case recognized that in this field by
stating 'The hours and place of public discussion can be
controlled.' '' Sound trueks, the opinion continued, create
a problem which differs from other means employed to communicate ideas. "The unwilling listener is not like the
passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but
<'annot be made to take it. In his home or on the street
he is practically helpless to escape this interference with
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the protl·etion
for the

r•xereise of
broadeasts of
from
ways of
business streets of (·ities like Trenton, ·with its more than
123,000
sueh distraetions would be dangerous to
t raffle at aH hours useful for the dissemination of informai
and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and transo desirable for city dwellers ·would likewise be at
1hr mercy of advoeates of particular religious, social or politi(·al JWrsnasions. \Y e eannot believe that rights of free speech
a rmmicipality to allow such mechanical voiee amplifleation on any of its streets.
'' 'rhe right of free speedr is guaranteed every citizen
that he may reach the minds of willing listeners . . . [but]
[i] t is an extravagant extension of due process to say that
because of it a city cannot forbid talking on the streets
through a loud speaker in a loud and raucous tone . . . .
Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionable sound
on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech
than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on
ihe streets. . . . Section 4 of the ordinance bars sound trucks
from broa(1easting in a louc1 and raucous manner on the
streets. There is no restriction upon the communication of
ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers. \Ve think that the need
for reasonable protection in the homes or business houses
from the distracting noise;,; of vehicles equipped with such
l'onnd amplifying devices justifies the ordiname." ( 836 U.S.
86-89.)
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice ,Jackson concurred
;;eparately. lVIr. Justice Rutledge stated his vieiYS in a dissenting opinion and Mr. ,Justice Black's conclusions in critieism of the decision were approved by Mr .•Justice Douglas
and Mr. Justice Rutledge. Mr. Justice Mnrphy dissented
1vitlwut opinion.
;\:-; 1he ordinallt·(~ of l•'rest1o ( ~ouniy 'lw·s 11ot
to any person or agency a discretion in determining who may
operate sonnd amplification devices, it is not subject to at-
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1rhat
what may
nor discriminate among those who would
mal\e inroads upon the
it is not for us to supervise the limits the
in

the United
whether
any situation an
the use of sound trucks may be
absolute
upheld. Commentntors in the field of constitntional law are
1n
See comments,
22 So.CaLhHev. 41G;
626; 34 Io1Ya ILRev.
()81;
Mich.L.Hev. 1007; 14 Mo.L.Rev. 194; ()2 Harv.h
Hev.
) The
has cited the Kovacs case as a recogniof the state to
within constitutional
of a com:rrrumt
S.Ct. 9~0, 95
arl i ficially
( P11bl1:c Util06 I1.Ed.
some state eon rts have upthe use of sound trucks.

voice when

vices

It 1s
of the limitation
upon the volume with which sound trucks may be operated
to exclude them from use upon the
of the county.
may be conceded that
limitations are somewhat
than those
the ordinance in the
Kovacs case, but little if any difference
to the restrietions upon volnme. 'l'here the court
determination of "loud and raucous" made in
sufficient to justify
the ordinance to Kovacs.
In a footnote to the opinion of Mr. Justice Reed are
from the
in the state court
were relied upon as sufficient to justify that determination.
It was observed: "The New Jersey courts may have concluded
that the necessity of search by the
to locate the
sound truck on a street was sufficient evidence of loudness
and raucousness'' and again: '
the last-quoted paraassumes that all sound trucks
Joud and raucous
noise.'' (P. 84, fn.
The limitations
the definitions included within the
ordinance are no more restrictive than those
the
Court.
The present ordinance is declared to be an emergency
measure ''necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public well-being and safety." The statement of that neces-
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is as follows: "The

C.2d

of

highways and
aircraft
interferes \Yith the
enjoyment of
private property, and the distraction thereof
interferes with the traveling public
a hazard to the
of persons
said highways and
"
The
in the exercise of the
state, has a legitimate interest in the
and tranquility of its citizens. It cannot be said that the
ordinance is not
directed to that end.
[3] Haggrrty, howewr, rPntenrls that 1he ordillance also offends the
of due proeess in its otl1cr l1efinition:s of
the activities properly to be included within the seope of its
prohibitions. The contention that ''loud and raucous'' itself
is so vague and indefinite as to establish no ascertainable
standard of guilt was passed upon in the KoYacs case, where
it was pointed ont that " [ w] hile these are abstract words,
they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys
to any interested person a sufficiently aecnrate concept of what
is forbidden." (336 U.S. 79.)
[4] A similar contention is made \Yith regard to the
definition in clause one as including the noise of "the motor
of any automobile, truck, tractor,
or aircraft of
any kind not reasonably required in the operation thereof
under the circumstances . . . . '' It is argued that ''reasonably required" is too Yague and indefinite a standard of guilt.
Reliance is placed upon cases which have held to be too indefinite such phrases as ''reasonable profits,'' ''greater or less
than real value," "current rate of per diem wages in the
locality where the work is performed.'' (Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 [47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146]; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 [34
S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284} ; Connally v. General Construction
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 [46 S.Ct. 126, 70 r~.Ed. 322} .) These
cases, however, involve loose definitions in fields where generally there may be great differences of opinion as to V\'hat
conduet may be reasonable. A restriction upon the operation
of motor vehicles so as to eliminate unreasonable noises
operates in an area where a determination as to what is necessary and reasouable may be made more precisely and has a
content of fairly fixed meaning to operators of such vehicles.
More nearly in poiut are prohibitions against "unreasonable
or unsafe speed" (held constitutional in Ex parte Daniels,
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P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172]); and the use
loud or harsh sound.''
Code, §
[5] Clause four is attacked on the same ground of indefiniteness because of the use of the phrase ''of such volume,
power as to interfere with the peace and
, or
" of other persons on private property or on the highway.
does not challenge the sufficiency of the
''peace and quiet,'' but concedes that if the entire
ordinance were equated to that standard it would withstand
constitutional challenge. His objection is to "interfere," and
"tend to interfere" with such peaee and quiet. 'fhere is no
merit to this contention. Both ''interfere'' and ''tend'' have
well recognized, defined meanings. (Of. Conger v. Italian
Vineyard Co., 186 Cal. 404, 407 [199 P. 503] ["the term
'interfere' bears the significance of 'disarrange', 'disturb',
'hinder'."]; State v. Hopkins, 64 N.D. 301 [252 N.W. 48, 51]
['"fhe word 'tend' means to be directed or have a tendeuey
to any end, object or purpose.''] ; Smulson v. Board of Dental
Examiners, 47 Cal.App.2d 584, 587 [ll8 P.2d 483] [upholding a statute prohibiting advertising statements which
are of a character "tending to deceive or mislead the public."].)
Other contentions made by Haggerty, if accepted, would
not require the court to hold that the ordinance, upon its
face, is unconstitutional. Insofar as they tend to establish
the inYalidity of the ordinance in its application to him, they
may be considered upon a retrial in connection with that
question. 7\o other points relied npon reqnin' discussion.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, ,J., Schauer, J., and Spence, .J., conellrred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The sound trucks involved in the present controversy were
being used on the highways and on roads adjacent to farmR
for the purpose of attracting the attention of farm workerR
as a means of inducing them to quit work and engage in a
strike to enforce union demands for higher wages.
According to the majority opinion the question presented
for determination is whej her the prohibition of the ordinance
under consideration is a reasonable one.
The ordinance (No. 413, clause ( 3) of subdivision (d) of
section 2.) with which we are here concerned defines "loud

sl1all not be abridged.
of the human voiee as the
ordinanee in
human

and thoroughare not conon ''private
' but that
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on public highways and
of free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution includes uot
the right to be free from rein the privacy of one's own home, but the
to reasonable regulation, to speak in other places
may be reached. As the Supreme Court of the
States said in Saia v. Sew York, 334 U.S. 558 [68
92 hEd.
, "Loud-speakers are today indisinstruments of effective public speech. The sound
truck has become an accepted method of political campaigniug. It is the way
are reached . . . . " What may be
permitted in some other place has no bearing whatsoever on
the public
and thoroughfares; what may be permitted in the way of the normal human voice or music on
highways is innnaterial when one considers that the human
voice is effectiYely silenced when not amplified through a
loud-speaker when ideas are sought to be disseminated from
the public highway. One may cry aloud his ideas in the
wilderness, but that is surely not an effective way to share
those ideas with the segment of the public one wishes to reach.
'l'o prohibit the use of sound trucks on public highways and
thoroughfares is to prohibit the dissemination of ideas to a
segment of the population which probably could be reached
iu no other way. Sound trucks on public highways are the
way many "people are reached." A writer in 34 Cornell
Law Quarterly 626 points out with considerable merit that
it is unrealistic to argue that what is meant by freedom of
is the native pmYer of human speech. The fact that
earlier holdings of the court only went so far as to uphold
the right of unamplified speech does not imply that " . . . one
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." (Schneider v. Irvington, 308
U.S. 147, 163 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155].) Similarly, it
is unsound to argue that one may not be permitted to use a
loud-speaker beeause free speech could be exercised in some
other manner-that is, without an amplifying device. The
broad language of the various opinions makes it plain that
c-onstitutional free speech is not limited to ancient forms of
expression.
In Sa1:a v. New York, supra (334 U.S. 558, 559, 560, 561)
where a permit was required for the use of a sound truck,
1\'Ir. Justice Douglas speaking for a majority of the court,
said that the ordinance in question '' . . . establishes a pre-

vions restra illt on
of
First Amendment which is
Arnemlnwnt
State action.
amplifier OlJC' lias to
'l'here are no standards
disc ret ion. 'l'hc statute is
thP hours or

violation of the
J<'ourtrentl1
or
Chic£ of Police.
of his
1 he

or 1}],, yolume ol'
must be
u,;kd. The
ordinance therefore has all the vwes of the Olles which Wl'
struck dom1 iu Cantwell v.
310 U.S. 2DG [GO
S.Ct. 900, 84 lJ.Ed.
128 A.IdL
:30:3 U.S. 444
S.Ct.
hEd.
83 L.Ed.
The
C.l.O., :307 U.S. 496
court also said: "Loud-speakers
indispensable instruments of effective public specd1. The sound truck has
l.Jl:(:ome an accepted method of
cam paig uing. It is
1he way people are reached. . . .
''The present ordinance woulcl be a dangerous weapon if
it \\"ere allowed to get a hold on om· public life. Noise can be
regnlate(l by regulating decibels. The hours and place of
publie discussion ean be controlled. Bnt to allow the poliee
to bar the use of loud-speakers bceanse 1heir use ean be abused
is like barring radio receivers because 1hey too make a noise.
The police needuot be giwn the power to deny a mau the usc
of his radio in order to protect a
against sleepless
nights. 'fhe same is true hrre.
'' ~tl,.ny abuses which loml-speakers create can be controlled
by narrowly drawn statntes. \Vhen a
allows an official
to ban them in his uncontrolled diseretion, it sanetions a device for suppression of free communication of ideas. In this
ease a permit is denied because sc>mc persons were said to
!Ja,·e found the sound annoying. In tlw next one a
may be denied because some people find the ideas annoyillg.
Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound.
The power of censorship inherent in tlJis type of ordinance
reveals its vice.''
'l'his is the only clear-cut expn'ssi(Jll by the Supl'cme Court
of the United States. Tt is admitte(1 in the
opinion
in the present eas(~, and by all leg-al writers nnd eommelt1ators (62 IIarY.lJ.HeY. 1228; 47 lVIieh.hHcv. 1007: 97 U.Pa.
L.Rev. 7:30; 34 Cornell L.Q. G26; 34 I(nva L.Hev. 681; 14 JVfo.
hRev. 194; 22 So.Cal.L.Hev. 416) tlmt the later case of
Ko1,acs v. Coopc1', :3:l6 l:T.S. 77 [69 S.Ct. 448, 9:3 L.Ed. fi1:3,
10 A.L.R2d ti08l, ·while easting some doubt on the holding in

so1!JH1

(the
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hr Saia ease, because of the many opinions, has caused
"
eonfusion" m the field of regulation of sound
trucks. 'l'here is no
decision in the Kovacs ease
which
as the
in effect does
that sound
tnwks may br
prohibited since three of the ,Jus1 ices
Bul'ton and
1he grou nil that the state courts had
it not as an
absolute
but
as
sound trucks that emitted
"loud and raucous noises." The Saia case expressly points
out that "[a]ny abuses which loud-speakers create can be
eontrollctl
drawn statutes." Also, as pointed out
in lhe Saia case, an ordinance could be dravm relating to
such sound trucks by regulating the volume of sound, the
of use in the interests of the public peace
illH1
1rithout imposing either a prior, or absolute,
rPstraint on the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
Htates. As \HlS pointed out in an article in 22 So. California
r,aw Heview 416, 420, the crucial problem is one of differentiating bet\reen the right of local government legitimately
to exercise proper
regulations which will encroach on
constitutional rights, and the right of a group of individuals
to be secure in their exercise of a constitutionally given freedom. A balance has been struck in other fields where individual freedoms must be some\Yhat circumscribed in the
interest of the pnblie p:ood. No good reason appears why the
same thing may not be accomplished in this field without the
of absolute prohibition.
'l'he onlinanee involYed in the Kovacs ease related to the
ttse of sound trucks on the public streets, alleys or thoroughfares within the city of Trenton, New ,Jersey. The area
in the ordinance here involved is not so circnmseribed. In State v. Headley, (Fla.) 48 So.2d 80, an ordinanee of the City of Miami prohibited the operation on city
streets of yehieles to whieh meehanieal loud-speakers had
bren aitachecl. It \Yas held there that the right of a citizen
to use the public streets was not absolute and unconditional
but might be controlled and regulated ill the interest of the
public good. '!'he appellant in the Headley ease was arrested
for
a lo1d-speal\er attached to his vehicle while ou a
downtown steeet whid1 was l;ighly eongested with traffic.
In Brinkrnan v. City
Gainesville, 83 Oa.App. 508 [64
8.E.2(1 3,14], an ordinm1ee prohibited the operation of a lonclspeakrr npon ihc streets of the city of Gainesville. '!'he ordi-
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nance was held constitutional as not violative of the freedoms of speech and religion. The ordinance involved in the
case at bar makes unlawful the emission or transmission of
'' . . . any loud or raucous noise upon or from any public
highway or public thoroughfare or from any aircraft of any
kind whatsoever.''
It may be agreed that Jl.fr. Justice Reed was correct when
he said (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
82 [69 S.Ct. 448,
93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608]) that "
nrestrained use
throughout a municipality of all sound
devices
would be intolerable." He added that "
bsolute prohibition within municipal limits of all sound amplification, even
though reasonably regulated in place, time and volume, is
undesirable and probably unconstitutional as an unreasonable
interference with normal activities." (Emphasis added.)
I would affirm the judgment to the extent that it enjoins
enforcement of clause ( 3) of subdivision (d) of section 2. of
Ordinance No. 415 on the ground that it is unconstitutional
on its face as an abridgment of freedom of
guaranteed
to the individual by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States. I express no opinion
concerning the constitutionality of the balance of the ordinance in question.
Traynor, J., concurred.
Respondent 'R petition for a
Hl55. Gibson, C.•J., Cartrr, .J., and
opinion that the petition should be granted.

